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Abstract. Combining two or more items and selling them as one good,
a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing
the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we
consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both
the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We
present some key insights about, as well as a technique for, locating mu-
tually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation.
The essence of our approach lies in combining historical sales data, con-
densed into aggregate knowledge, with current data about the ongoing
negotiation process, to exploit these insights.
In particular, when negotiating a given bundle of goods with a customer,
the shop analyzes the sequence of the customer’s offers to determine the
progress in the negotiation process. In addition, it uses aggregate knowl-
edge concerning customers’ valuations of goods in general. We show how
the shop can use these two sources of data to locate promising alter-
natives to the current bundle. When the current negotiation’s progress
slows down, the shop may suggest the most promising of those alterna-
tives and, depending on the customer’s response, continue negotiating
about the alternative bundle, or propose another alternative.
Extensive computer simulation experiments show that our approach in-
creases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number
and quality of the deals reached, as compared to a benchmark. In addi-
tion, we show that the performance of our system is robust to a variety
of changes in the negotiation strategies employed by the customers.
1 Introduction
Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called
bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing,
⋆ This is an extended version of our paper with the same title that was accepted for the
5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies (EC-
Web 2004), August 30–September 3, 2004 in Zaragoza, Spain In: Bauknecht, Kurt,
Martin Bichler & Birgit Pro¨ll (eds.) E-Commerce and Web Technologies, LNCS 3182,
marketing, and selling products [1]. In addition, and maybe more importantly,
bundling can stimulate demand for (other) goods or services [2–4]. To stimulate
demand by offering bundles of goods, requires knowledge of customer prefer-
ences. Traditionally, firms first acquire such aggregated knowledge about cus-
tomer preferences, for example through market research or sales data, and then
use this knowledge to determine which bundle-price combinations they should
offer. Especially for online shops, an appealing alternative approach would be
to negotiate bundle-price combinations with customers:3 in that case, aggregate
knowledge can be used to facilitate an interactive search for the desired bun-
dle and price. Due to the inherently interactive characteristics of negotiation,
such an approach can very effectively adapt the configuration of a bundle to the
preferences of a customer. A high degree of bundle customization can increase
customer satisfaction, which may lead to an increase in the demand for future
goods or services.
In this paper, we present an approach that allows a shop to make use of
aggregate knowledge about customer preferences. Our procedure uses aggregate
knowledge aboutmany customers in bilateral negotiations of bundle-price combi-
nations with individual customers. Negotiating concerns selecting a subset from
a collection of goods or services, viz. the bundle, together with a price for that
bundle. Thus, the bundle configuration—an array of bits, representing the pres-
ence or absence of each of the shop’s goods and services in the bundle—together
with a price for the bundle, form the negotiation issues. In theory, this is just an
instance of multi-issue negotiation. Like the work of [7–10], our approach tries
to benefit from the so-called win-win opportunities offered by multi-issue nego-
tiation, by finding mutually beneficial alternative bundles during negotiations.
The novelty of the approach, however, lies in the use of aggregate knowledge
of customer preferences. We show that a bundle with the highest ‘gains from
trade’ Pareto-dominates all other bundles within a certain collection of bun-
dles.4,5 Based on this important insight, we develop an approach for combining
aggregate knowledge of customer preferences with data about the ongoing ne-
gotiation process, to find alternative bundles that are likely to lead to the high-
est Pareto improvements. Computer simulations show how, for various types
of customers—with distinct negotiation heuristics—our procedure increases the
speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and the Pareto effi-
ciency of the deals reached.
In the context of bundling, the distinction between complementary and non-
complementary goods is important. In the case of complementary goods, the
3 See [5, 6] for other online bundling approaches.
4 The gains from trade for a bundle are equal to the customer’s ‘valuation’ of the
bundle minus the seller’s valuation of the bundle, which is his (minimum) price. The
term refers to the gains obtained from trading the bundle for the price: both sides
benefit from trading whenever the customer’s valuation is higher than the seller’s.
5 An offer constitutes a Pareto improvement compared to another offer whenever it
makes one bargainer better off without making the other worse off. Thus a bundle b′
Pareto-dominates another bundle b whenever switching from bundle b to that bundle
b′ results in a Pareto improvement.
valuation of a bundle is higher than the sum of the valuations of the indi-
vidual goods. Bundling complementary goods clearly results in higher gains
from trade and is therefore mutually beneficial. Firms usually know beforehand
which goods do and which do not complement one another (e.g., bicycle and
bicycle tier, copier and toner, etc.), and for complementary goods they will
make straightforward bundling decisions accordingly. For an important subclass
of non-complementary goods—so-called additively separable goods—the bundle
valuation is obtained by just adding up the individual valuations. In that case,
the way in which bundling may be advantageous is less clear: it depends on the
shop’s and the customer’s valuations. The shop may enjoy economies of scale
or scope in the production or distribution of goods, while the customer’s valu-
ations for different goods may be correlated (see [11] and the references cited
therein). It is this setting of additively separable goods that we will focus on
in the current paper. A cable provider with TV, phone, internet, and pay TV
services offers an example of additively separable goods. Another example is the
common practice of mobile phone operators in Europe to offer prepaid subscrip-
tions for fixed amounts of SMS, long-distance minutes, international calls, and
other services. A final example is an online news provider selling various news
items in relatively independent categories such as sports, finance, culture, and
science.
For numerous real world applications—like the ones mentioned above—the
number of individual goods to be bundled, n, is relatively small. In this paper
we will also consider only small values of n (say n ≤ 10), for which aggregate
knowledge still greatly facilitates the process of finding attractive alternative
bundles during a negotiation process. For example, with n = 10, there are 2n −
1 = 1023 possible bundle configurations, so facilitating the search process among
all those bundles is highly valuable. On the other hand, obtaining the desired
aggregate knowledge is still manageable, since with additively separable goods
this only requires information about customers’ valuations for individual goods,
and not for all possible bundles.
The next section provides a high-level overview of the interaction model. In
Section 3 we introduce relatively mild conditions on the seller’s and his cus-
tomers’ preferences. Based on these conditions, Section 4 develops a procedure
for finding the most promising alternative bundles. In order to test the per-
formance of our system, we used it in interactions with simulated customers.
Section 5 presents our computer experiments and discusses the results. Conclu-
sions follow in Section 6.
2 Overview
This section gives an overview of the interaction between the shop and the cus-
tomer, as they try to negotiate an agreement about the price and the composition
of a bundle of goods. The shop sells a total of n goods, each of which may be
either absent or present in a bundle, so that there are 2n − 1 distinct bundle-
configurations containing at least 1 good. In the current paper, we use n = 10.
A negotiation concerns a bundle (configuration), together with a price for that
bundle, and it is conducted in an alternating exchange of offers and counter
offers [12], typically initiated by the customer. An example of such a practice
may involve the sale of bundles of news items in categories like politics, finance,
economy, sports, arts, etc.
We develop a procedure that a seller can use to find mutually beneficial alter-
native bundles during the negotiation about a given bundle, so that alternative
bundles may be recommended whenever the negotiation about the given bun-
dle stalls. Specifically, the procedure finds Pareto improvements by changing the
bundle content.5 It uses information specific to the current negotiation process as
well as aggregate knowledge.6 The ongoing negotiation is analyzed to determine
when an alternative bundle is needed, and both the ongoing negotiation process
and the aggregate knowledge are used to assess which bundle to recommend.
A customer can explicitly reject a suggested bundle by specifying a counter
offer with a different bundle content (e.g., the previous one), and she can im-
plicitly reject a suggested bundle by offering a low price for it. In the current
paper, only implicit rejection is allowed: customers only specify the bundle con-
tent for the opening offer, and thereafter only the seller can change the bundle
content of an offer. This is to ease the description of our model and solutions.
The possibility for customers to explicitly reject or change the bundle content
can be easily incorporated in our model and solutions, however.
Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the interaction between a shop
and a customer. The shaded elements are part of the actual negotiation—the
exchange of offers. The process starts with the customer indicating her interests,
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Fig. 1. A flowchart describing the integration of recommendation in a shop and a
customer’s alternating exchange of offers and counter offers.
6 Aggregate knowledge may be obtained by analyzing past sales data or provided by
marketing experts.
by specifying the bundle they will initially negotiate about. After that, they enter
into a loop (indicated by the dotted line) which ends only when a deal is made,
or with a 1% exogenous probability. (We do not model bargainers’ impatience
explicitly; therefore we need an exogenous stopping condition, which specifies
the chance of bargaining breakdown.) In the loop, the customer makes an offer
for the current bundle b, indicating the price she wants to pay for it. The shop
responds to this offer either by accepting it, or by considering a recommendation.
In any case, conditional upon the 99% continuation probability, the shop also
makes an offer, either for the current bundle b or for a recommended bundle b′
(which then becomes the current bundle).
In the model, the valuations of the customers and the seller are expressed
as monetary values. The utilities of deals are expressed as strictly monotonic
one-dimensional transformations of valuations. In the simplest form, this would
be the difference between the valuation of the bundle and the negotiated price.
The agents are interested in obtaining a deal with optimal utility (“net monetary
value”). See Section 3 for details.
3 Preference Model
3.1 Informal Discussion
The essence of our model of valuations and preferences lies in the assumption
that customers and seller order bundles based on their net monetary value; the
bundle with the highest net monetary value is the most preferred bundle. A
customer’s net monetary value of a bundle is equal to the customer’s valuation
of the bundle (expressed in money) minus the bundle price and the seller’s net
monetary value is equal to the bundle price minus the seller’s bundle valuation
(also expressed in money).
Given the above assumption and the assumption that a customer wants to
buy at most one bundle (within a given time period), Section 3.2 shows that any
deal involving the bundle with the highest gains from trade is Pareto efficient.
We can now specify which is the best bundle for the seller to advise: faced
with the problem of recommending one bundle out of a collection of bundles,
the “best” bundle to recommend is the bundle with the highest expected gains
from trade; this bundle Pareto dominates all other bundles. (Section 3.2 can be
skipped upon first reading.)
3.2 Formal Discussion
Before being able to more formally state the results, some notation is necessary.
Let N ⊂ N, with n = |N |, denote the collection of n individual goods and 2N
denotes the power set of N (i.e., the collection of all subsets of n), then B =
2N \ {∅} denotes the collection of all possible bundles. Furthermore, let P = R
denote the collection of all possible bundle prices.7 The customer and the seller
attach the monetary values of vc(b) and vs(b), respectively, to a bundle b ∈ B
(with vc(b), vs(b) ∈ P ). The function xj : B × P 7→ R with j ∈ {c, s} denotes
the net monetary value for bundle b and bundle price p: xc(b, p) = vc(b)− p and
xs(b, p) = p− vs(b) denote the customer’s and the seller’s net monetary values,
respectively.
We assume that the customer’s and the seller’s utility for consuming bundle
b for a price p, denoted by uj(b, p) with j ∈ {c, s}, can be expressed as the
composition function gj ◦ xj(b, p) with j ∈ {c, s} and gj : R 7→ R. For gj we
assume that
dgj(x)
dx
> 0 for all x ∈ R and j ∈ {c, s}.
Given the customer’s and seller’s monetary values, we define a useful subset
B∗ of B as follows: B∗ ≡ argmaxb∈B(vc(b) − vs(b)), that is, B∗ represents the
collection of bundles with the highest gains from trade. We are now ready to
introduce the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A deal (b, p) with b ∈ B and p ∈ P is Pareto efficient if and
only if b ∈ B∗.
Remark 1 A deal (b, p) is Pareto efficient if there is no (b′, p′) such that uj(b, p) ≤
uj(b
′, p′) for all j ∈ {c, s} and the inequality is strict for at least one j.
Proposition 1 means that a deal is Pareto efficient if and only if it entails a
bundle with the highest gains from trade. For the proof of this proposition the
following lemma is very useful.
Lemma 1 For any two deals (b∗, p∗) and (b, p) with p∗, p ∈ P , b∗ ∈ B∗, and
b ∈ B \B∗ we have xc(b, p) < xc(b
∗, p∗) or xs(b, p) < xs(b
∗, p∗).
Proof. We prove the above lemma by contradiction. Suppose that for any b∗ ∈
B∗ and b ∈ B \ B∗ we have xc(b, p) ≥ xc(b∗, p∗) and xs(b, p) ≥ xs(b∗, p∗).
A necessary conditions for this to hold is that vc(b) − vs(b) ≥ vc(b∗) − vs(b∗).
However, b∗ ∈ B∗ and b ∈ B\B∗ means, by definition of B∗, that vc(b)−vs(b) <
vc(b
∗)− vs(b∗).
We are now ready to prove proposition 1.
Proof. 1. (If) Pick any j ∈ {c, s}. Suppose that j’s position improves by moving
from any deal (b, p) with b ∈ B∗ to (b′, p′), that is, uj(b, p) < uj(b′, p′). It
then suffices to show that the opponent denoted by j′ will always be made
worse off, that is, uj′(b, p) > uj′(b
′, p′). From the properties of gj and gj′
it follows that a bargainer’s position improves/worsens whenever the net
monetary value increases/decreases. Since j’s position improves, it follows
from lemma 1 that j′ is made worse off whenever b ∈ B \ B∗. Moreover, if
b∗, b ∈ B∗ then the gains from trade remain unchanged, hence j′ is made
worse off.
7 Negative prices may not be realistic, but we want to make as few behavioral assump-
tions as possible. For the results the possibility of negative prices is not problematic
(see footnote 8).
2. (Only if) We will prove this part by contradiction. Suppose that b /∈ B∗ with
the price being any p ∈ P . Pick any b′ ∈ B∗ and set the bundle price to
p′ = p+ vs(b
′)− vs(b), so that p
′ − vs(b
′) = p− vs(b). It follows from p ∈ P
that p′ ∈ P (recall that P = R)8 and the properties of gs that the seller is
indifferent between the deals (b, p) and (b′, p′). Also, it follows from lemma 1
and the properties of gc that the customer is made better off. That is, any
b′ ∈ B∗ Pareto dominates b /∈ B∗. Thus b /∈ B∗ cannot be a Pareto efficient
solution.
4 Recommendation Mechanism
The idea is to develop a mechanism for a seller to find Pareto improvements
by changing the bundle content during a negotiation. The mechanism we pro-
pose contains two subprocedures. The first procedure—telling the shop when
to recommend—monitors the negotiation process and determines when to pass
control to the second procedure, which generates recommendations based on ag-
gregate knowledge and the ongoing negotiation process. Figure 1 already showed
the interaction between these two procedures; they are discussed in more detail
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
4.1 Deciding When to Recommend
The shop needs a procedure for deciding when he should recommend negotiating
about a different bundle. The obvious input for this decision is the progress of
the current negotiation process, which can be described as a sequence of offers
and counteroffers. An offer O contains a bundle definition and a price: O = (b, p)
with b ∈ B and p ∈ P . (B and P denote the collections of all possible bundles
and prices, respectively.) Let h = (O(1), O(2), . . . , O(k)) denote a finite history
of offers (k is a natural number), where O(i + 1) is the counter offer for O(i),
for all i < k. Furthermore, let H denote the universe of all possible finite offer
sequences (thus h ∈ H). The problem of when to advise can now be specified as
the mapping f : H 7→ {yes, no}, where “yes” means: recommend a new bundle.
We construct a heuristic for f based on the assumption that there is a proba-
bility of not reaching a deal with a customer (e.g., a break off, endless repetition,
or deadline): the longer the negotiation is expected to take, the less likely a deal
is expected to become. Furthermore, as a deal becomes less likely, the incentive
for the shop to recommend negotiation about an alternative deal should increase.
Given the seller’s bargaining strategy then, our heuristic extrapolates the time
the current negotiation process will need to reach a deal, from the pace with
which the customer is currently giving in. More precisely, if we let O = (b, p)
and O′ = (b, p′) denote the customer’s current and previous offers for bundle b,
8 If we choose to a priori rule out p < 0 and vj(b) < 0 (for j ∈ {c, s} and all b ∈ B),
then p ≥ vs(b) should hold because otherwise the seller will not be willing to sell the
bundle in the first place. Consequently, p′ ∈ P still holds.
then ∆t, the predicted remaining number of negotiation rounds needed to reach
a deal, is defined as follows:
∆t =
vs(b)− p′
p− p′
, (1)
where vs(b) denotes the seller’s monetary value for bundle b. The higher ∆t,
the higher the likelihood of a recommendation. Specifically, the probability of a
recommendation depends on ∆t as follows:
prrecommendation = 1− exp(−0.25∆t),
which means that the probability that the shop recommends an alternative bun-
dle approaches 1 as ∆t increases.
4.2 Deciding What to Recommend
Our mechanism combines aggregate knowledge (obtained from the analysis of
sales data and (anonymous) data on previous negotiations, market research, or
expert knowledge) with data on the ongoing bargain process, to recommend
bundles to customers while negotiating with them. Suppose, for example, that
a customer offers to buy a bundle b at a price p. When a recommendation is
needed (see Section 4.1) the idea is to select from within the “neighborhood” of
bundle b, the bundle b′ that maximizes E[vc(b
′)− vs(b′)|vc(b) ≥ p], the expected
gains from trade—given that a customer is willing to pay at least the price p for
bundle b. Since the seller knows its own monetary value for bundle b′, vs(b
′), the
aim is really to maximize E[vc(b
′)|vc(b) ≥ p]− vs(b′). The difficulty here lies in
estimating the customer’s expected valuation of the bundle:
E[vc(b
′)|vc(b) ≥ p] =
∑
i∈P
pr(vc(b
′) = i|vc(b) ≥ p), (2)
where pr(vc(b
′) = i|vc(b) ≥ p) denotes the probability that the customer’s valua-
tion for bundle b is equal to i, given that she is willing to pay at least p for bundle
b. (To simplify notation we will write E[vc(b
′)|b] instead of E[vc(b′)|vc(b) ≥ p].)
Aggregate knowledge can provide an estimation of E[vc(b
′)|b]. Given that the
shop sells n individual goods, there are 2n−1 possible bundles containing at least
1 good. To determine E[vc(b
′)|b] for all possible bundle pairs, requires—worst
case—an order of (2n)2 estimations. When the customer’s valuation for a bundle
is just the sum of her valuations of the individual goods comprising the bundle,
as it is assumed in the current paper, this complexity is reduced significantly.
Given that a customer’s valuation of bundle b, vc(b), is simply the sum of the
valuations of the goods comprising bundle b,
E[vc(b
′)|b] =
∑
i∈b′
E[vc(i)|b]. (3)
This requires at worse “only” n·2n estimations of conditional expectations, which
is manageable for n = 10, as in the current paper. For larger values of n it quickly
becomes infeasible to estimate these expectations. In that case, it is necessary
to approximate most of the conditional probabilities based on a limited number
of explicit estimations. In this paper the focus lies on applications where n · 2n
is still a manageable number, so discussing approximation techniques is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Generating Recommendations A customer initiates the negotiation process
by proposing an initial bundle and offering an opening price: let O(0) = (b, p)
denote the customer’s opening offer (with b ∈ B and p ∈ P ). The shop stores
the bundle proposed by the customer as the customer’s “interest bundle,” in the
neighborhood of which he searches for promising alternative bundles to recom-
mend if, at any time, the shop decides he should make a recommendation (see
Section 4.1). This neighborhood of bundle b, Ng(b), is defined as follows.
Ng(b) ≡ {b′ ∈ B : (b′ ⊂ b and |b′|+ 1 = |b|) or (b′ ⊃ b and |b′| − 1 = |b|)}, (4)
In other words, Ng(b) contains the bundles which, in binary representation, have
a Hamming distance to b of 1.9 The advantage of advising bundles within the
neighborhood of b is that the advice is less likely to appear haphazard.
Having defined a bundle’s neighborhood, let the ordered set A denote the
so-called “recommendation set,” obtained by ordering the neighborhood Ng(b)
on the basis of the estimated expected gains from trade of all the bundles b′ in
bundle b’s neighborhood, Eˆ[vc(b
′)|b]− vs(b′), where Eˆ denotes the estimation of
E. Let A¯ denote the unordered set of previously proposed bundles.
To recommend a bundle bk (the k
th recommendation, with k ≥ 1), our mech-
anism removes the first bundle from A, adds a price to it and proposes it as part
of the shop’s next offer, and then adds it to A¯. Depending on the customer’s
counter offer for bundle bk, a number of additional bundles may be added to the
advice set: if the customer’s response is very promising (to be defined below),
bundle bk will be taken as the customer’s new interest bundle (in the neighbor-
hood of which the search continues), and the bundles in the neighborhood of bk
are added to A.
Intuitively, in order to determine how promising a bundle bk is in terms of
its potential for generating gains from trade, the shop needs to compare the net
monetary value of the new bundle bk, with the current highest net monetary
value among all previous bundles. A relatively large improvement over the cur-
rently most promising bundle—the shop’s estimation of the customer’s ‘interest
bundle’—will cause the shop to update his estimation of the customer’s ‘interest
bundle’. However, because the shop does not know the customer’s valuation for
a bundle, he simply compares offered and asked prices for bundles.
To specify this in more detail, let Oct denote the sequence of offers placed by
the customer up until time t, and let max(Oct ) specify the customer’s past offer
with the highest difference between the customer’s offered and the shop’s asked
9 Remember that each bundle can be represented as a string containing n bits indi-
cating the presence or absence in the bundle, of each of the shop’s n goods.
price. Then the shop will determine the impact of recommending bundle bk by
comparing the customer’s current offer for bundle bk, O(t+1) with that of offer
max (Oct ), from the perspective of his own bid for bundle bk. For this purpose,
the shop uses the function sign : R×R 7→ {0, 1, 2}. If we let max (Oct ) = (b
′, p′c),
the customer’s current offer O(t+1) = (b, pc), and the shop’s bids for bundles b
and b′ be O(b′, p′s) and O(b, ps), then
signb,b′(p, p
′) =


2 if pc−ps
p′c−p
′
s
> (1 + threshold)
1 if 1 ≤ pc−ps
p′c−p
′
s
≤ (1 + threshold)
0 otherwise
. (5)
If sign(p, p′) = 2, then the shop’s assessment of the customer’s interest bundle
is updated to be bk: the customer’s response is promising enough to divert the
search towards the neighborhood of bk, and add that neighborhood to A such
that the first elements of A all lie in the neighborhood of bk. That is, the first
element of A becomes the bundle b′ ∈ Ng(bk) with the maximum difference
Eˆ[vc(b
′)|bk] − vs(b
′), the second element of A becomes the bundle b′′ with the
second highest difference Eˆ[vc(b
′′)|bk]−vs(b′′), and so on. In addition, duplicates
are removed from A, as are bundles already present in A¯. In case sign(p, p′) = 1,
the customer’s response is promising enough to continue negotiating about the
current bundle bk, but not promising enough to change the assessment of the
customer’s interest bundle, and if sign(p, p′) = 0, the proposed bundle was not
promising at all and the seller will immediately make the next recommendation.
5 Numerical Experiments
In order to test the performance of our proposed mechanism, we implemented
it computationally, and tested it against many simulated customers. Valuations
for the shop and the customers were drawn from random distributions. First we
describe how we handled the approximation process and how we implemented
negotiations in the simulation, and then we present our experimental design and
simulation results.
5.1 Modeling E[vc(b
′)|b]
In the experiments we abstract away from actually learning E[vc(b
′)|b], for ex-
ample from sales data. Instead we derive these conditional expectations directly
from the way we specified the underlying stochastic process.
As explained earlier, we assume additively separable customer preferences. To
compute the customer’s valuation for a bundle b we simply add up her valuations
for the individual goods that constitute the bundle:
vc(b) =
∑
i∈b
vc(i). (6)
Let N denote the collection of all the individual goods from which bundles are
constructed, with |N | = n. Suppose we specify the joint probability density
function of the customer’s valuations for the individual goods, pr(z1, . . . , zn),
as an n-variate normal distribution. Let the vector µ = (µ1, · · · , µn) denote the
mean of the distribution and let the matrix Σ = [σij ] denote the covariance
matrix. Then pr(z1, . . . , zn) ∼ N [µ,Σ].
The joint probability mass function of all bundle valuations, pr(z1, . . . , z2n),
is simply a linear transformation of pr(z1, . . . , zn). Since a linear transformation
of a multivariate normal distribution is also a multivariate normal distribution
[13], we have
pr(z1, . . . , z2n) ∼ N [Tµ,TΣT
′], (7)
where the matrix T specifies the linear transformation (a row in T specifies a
bundle in binary representation). Given N [Tµ,TΣT′] we can derive the value
of E[vc(b
′)|b] for any bundle pair. This approach implies that we simply hand
the shop the distributions underlying customers’ valuations.
5.2 Modeling Negotiations
Besides setting customer preferences it is necessary to specify how the shop and
the customer actually negotiate. To allow initiation of the negotiation process by
the customer, we assume that the customer starts negotiating about an initial
bundle binit . In order to give the shop some room for improvement, we initialize
the customer’s initial bundle as the bundle containing all the goods for which
her valuation is lower than her average valuation across all goods. Although
this seems to make it very easy for the shop to make an improvement, bare in
mind that performance refers to gains from trade, which depends on both the
customer’s and the shop’s valuations. Besides, we measure performance relative
to this starting point in our experiments.
Time-dependent Strategy For the customer (shop), the time-dependent bidding
strategy is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in both the number of bidding
rounds (t) and her (his) valuation. In particular, a bidding strategy is character-
ized by the gap the customer leaves between her initial offer and her valuation,
and by the speed with which she closes this gap. The gap is specified as a fraction
of the bundle valuation and it decreases over time as gap(t) = gapinit ·exp(−δt),
so over time, she approaches the valuation of the bundle she is currently negoti-
ating about. Note that changes in the gap are time-dependent, but not bundle-
dependent! This strategy is therefore called “time-dependent-fraction” (tdf).10
The initial gap, gapinit , and δ are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution
between [0, 0.5] and [0.1, 0.4], respectively. Almost the same holds for the shop’s
bidding strategy, mutatis mutandis. Since δ already fluctuates for the customer’s
strategy we do, however, set δ = 0.1 for the shop, in order to reduce the number
10 We originally implemented a time-dependent strategy that decreases an absolute
gap over time, but the results from that strategy were qualitatively similar to the
fraction strategy’s results, so we describe only the latter as they are more intuitive.
of jointly fluctuating parameters somewhat. Summing up, the customer (shop)
starts her bidding for a bundle at a randomly chosen point between her valuation
and (one and a) half her valuation, and gradually approaches her valuation with
her bids.
Tit-for-Tat Strategy The time-dependent strategy described above generates
bids irrespective of what the opponent does. As an example of a strategy that
responds to the opponent, we implemented a variant of tit-for-tat (tft) [14].
The initial ‘move’ is already specified by gapinit like in the tdf-strategy. If in
subsequent moves the utility level of the opponent offer improves, then a fraction
δ of that amount is conceded by the customer. Note that it is the increment in
the utility level perceived by the customer. Furthermore, this perceived utility
improvement can also be negative. To make the bidding behavior less chaotic,
no negative concessions are made. That is, we used a so-called monotone ver-
sion called tit-for-tat-monotone-fraction (tftmf) which can never generate a bid
with a worse utility than the previous bid.
5.3 Results
A Benchmark In order to assess the relative performance of the system we con-
ducted the same series of experiments (see below) with a benchmark procedure,
which randomly recommends a bundle from the current bundle’s neighborhood.
That is, the benchmark does not base the order in which it advises the next
bundle on the estimated expected gains from trade like our system does.
In our experiments there are 10 individual goods. We generate the means of
the underlying probability density function pr(z1, . . . , z10) by randomly sampling
numbers between 40 and 250 without repetition. To exclude negative numbers we
then randomly draw the variance of the 10 marginal distributions from a uniform
distribution such that the probability of a negative valuation for an individual
good is negligible, viz. at most 0.0003. In order to ensure sufficient differences in
valuations between customers, however, we fix the correlation matrix (but not
the covariance matrix). To test the robustness of our procedure to quantitative
changes in the underlying distributions we conducted a series of experiments
with 100 different distributions pr(z1, . . . , z10). For each distribution we tested
the influence on the system’s performance of changes in the ease with which the
shop updates his estimation of the customer’s “interest” (see the discussion of the
sign function in Section 4.2). The “threshold” used in the sign function captures
this sensitivity; we experimented with 11 values between 0 and 0.5, with stepsize
0.05. For each of these settings we simulated negotiations between the shop, with
randomly drawn valuations, which were kept constant across negotiations with
100 customers, each with her valuations drawn randomly from the particular
distribution used. The values in the graphs are averages across 100 customers
per distribution, and across 100 different distributions.
The shop’s bundle valuations are not additively separable, due to the foll-
woing nonlinear pricing strategy. Bundles with a higher than average expected
customer valuation—compared to bundle containing the same number of indi-
vidual goods—are relatively expensive. That is, for expensive bundle it is less
likely that customers are actually willing to be the offered good. Similarly, bun-
dles with a lower than expected valuation are relatively inexpensive (compared
to bundles of the same size).
Concerning the legends throughout, the graph for ‘rounds’ gives the number
of rounds it took, if a deal was reached, to reach that deal, and the graph for
‘deals’ shows the total number of deals reached in negotiations with the 100
customers. The ‘diff’ graphs show the difference between our system’s and the
benchmark’s performance. For an explanation of ‘perc’ and ‘relP,’ consider that
given the shop’s and the customer’s valuations and all the possible bundles,
there are maximum and minimum gains from trade attainable. The graph for
‘perc’ shows the gains from trade of the final bundle, as a percentage of the
difference between the maximum and minimum gains from trade, and ‘relP’
shows this percentage, relative to the difference between the maximum gains
from trade and the gains from trade of the initial bundle (the starting point of
the negotiation). As a final remark, bear in mind that the lines in the graphs are
included to allow easy identification of patterns, but only the symbols (squares,
diamonds, etc.) represent actual values measured in the simulation.
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Fig. 2. Results for our system (‘s’), when the shop uses the tdf strategy with δ = 0.1,
and the customers use either the tdf strategy with random δ (on the left), or the tftmf
strategy with random δ (in the middle) or with δ = 1 (on the right), as described in
section 5.2. The difference with the benchmark is indicated by the ‘diff’-graphs.
Figure 2 reports the results of three series of experiments (see the caption)
where we vary the bargaining strategy of the customers. For low thresholds, our
system generates roughly 70% of the maximum gains from trade and roughly
60% of the gains of trade attainable given the initial bundle. Its performance in
both cases is roughly 20% better than the benchmark. Additionally, more deals
are reached and it requires less time to reach these deals than the benchmark.
Initially, larger threshold values improve the performance of the benchmark.
As it searches the current interest bundle’s neighborhood in a random order,
increasing the threshold makes it change the interest bundle less haphazardly,
forcing it to focus longer on a particular interest bundle’s neighborhood, which
may contain better alternatives than the ones it encounters initially. Usually,
these better alternatives do exist, and they turn up in such a slower, and more
prudent search, leading to more deals as the threshold increases. As the threshold
increases further, however, the interest bundle is not updated as easily anymore,
thereby blocking the search in regions in the neighborhood of promising bun-
dles. This effect is also visible in the results of our system, which zeroes in on the
most promising bundle more quickly. For larger threshold values this effect be-
comes increasingly more important. Consequently, the difference in performance
reduces for larger values; ultimately, for a threshold of 0.5, there is virtually no
distinction in performance.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We consider the problem of negotiating over both bundle contents and price,
which permits a high degree of personalization of bundles to the preferences of
customers. We develop a procedure for a seller to search for Pareto improve-
ments in bundle contents, while negotiating about the price of bundles. Com-
puter experiments show how this procedure increases both the speed with which
agreements are reached, as well as the number and quality of agreements reached.
In the current paper, we have only considered additively separable consumer
preferences. The most important issue currently under investigation is the ex-
tension of our procedure to cases involving non-linear preferences.
Another issue concerns the distribution of valuations we used. Such a dis-
tribution generates preferences for customers, which may make them buy the
shop’s (bundles of) goods. Data about such sales, in turn, enable the shop to
estimate the distribution underlying his customers’ preferences. In the current
paper we provided the shop with the aggregate knowledge required for our pro-
cedure directly. Even without modeling this process explicitely, we are interested
in providing the shop with only an estimate of the real distribution and in testing
the robustness of our procedure to variations in the accuracy of the estimate.
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